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BACKGROUND
AMERICAN farmers have never known long periods of economic
stability. The best available evidence of their changeable situa-
tion is the index of wholesale prices of farm products in the
United States, which extends back to the end of the eighteenth
century (Figure i). In addition to relatively minor price move-
ments, which have followed each other in rapid succession, the
farm price index shows four violent movements since 1798,
each associated with a major war. And according to the Warren
and Pearson wholesale price index, there was another such
movement during the years of the Revolution.1 These disturb-
ances are due, of course, to wartime inflation and increases in
the demand for farm products, with a consequent rise in farm
prices and incomes, and eventually in farm land values and
debts. In the past, such periods of high prices and incomes have
been short-lived, and the ensuing periods of depression have
been severe and characterized by widespread farm mortgage
distress. Whether the rise associated with World War II will
have a like sequel remains to be seen. This introduction out-
lines the main features of the periods into which the last century
and a half of agricultural history can be conveniently divided,
with emphasis on trends affecting farm mortgage indebtedness
and farmers' ability to carry such indebtedness.
Nineteenth Century
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the United States
was recovering from the post-Revolutionary-War deflation.2 As
the Napoleonic Wars expanded the market for farm products,
agricultural conditions improved, except for a brief period
during which embargoes cut off exports, and agriculture entered
a period of price inflation culminating in the boom that oc-
curred during the War of 1812. Shortly after the peace the
demand for American farm staples declined abruptly, and for
1HistoricalStatistics of the United States, 1789-1945 (Bureau of the Census),
p.233.
2 Fewstatistics are available concerning American business conditions following
the Revolutionary War, but the newspapers carried many bankruptcy notices,
and some states passed "stay and tender" laws providing moratoria for certain
debts, or permitting debtors to tender goods, cattle, or land in settlement of
their obligations.4 INTRODUCTION
nearly a decade after the panic of 1818-20 agricultural prices
were low. Land values shrank drastically, and the subsequent
debt difficulties of farmers and others resulted in legislation to
protect and advance the interests of debtors. A Senate commit-
tee reported that "landed property was daily sacrificedat
Figure1. Index of Wholesale Prices, Farm and Nonfarm
Products, 1798-1952
BLS and Warren and Pearson indexes as compiled by Bureau of Agricultural Economics
= 100), revised (Through 1948 as in Agricultural Outlook Charts, 1950.)
Nonfarm products include all commodities other than farm products and foods.
sheriffs'sales for a half, a third, nay a quarter of its value, and
hundreds of industrious farmers thereby deprived of their
homes and the fruits of their labor. Merchandise, household
goods, and farming stock, would not bring at forced sale one-
half the cost of production."S
8JohnBach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States from the
Rez.'olution to the Civil War, Vol. 4 (1897),p. 495.INTRODUCTION 5
In the 1830's there was a period of farm prosperity marked
by heavy speculation in midwestern lands, followed by the panic
of 1837 and generally distressed conditions. Agriculture and
the rest of the economy suffered until 1843. Thereafter, except
for a few years, agricultural prices were increasingly favorable
until the end of the Civil War.
During the Civil War years farm prices doubled, and agricul-
ture prospered except in much of the South. With the return of
peace, however, prices started downward, credit tightened, and
lenders began to call loans. A long period of depression ensued,
which reached its depth in the panic of 1893. Heavy debts, along
with declining incomes, caused widespread suffering among
farmers, particularly in the West.
Twentieth Century through World War 1
Around the turn of the century agriculture again entered a
prosperous period. Developments in the two decades of pros-
perity up to 1920laidthe groundwork for much of the farm
mortgage distress occurring between 1920andi94o—the period
with which our investigation is chiefly concerned.
Prices of farm commodities rose steadily from their low point
shortly before 1900andby 1910hadnearly doubled. Between
1900and1910theaverage value of farm real estate per acre
doubled. Increases of 300percentand more occurred in many
counties in western Texas, the Great Plains, and the Mountain
region. In those areas much new land had been brought under
farming, including substantial acreages under irrigation. In the
northeastern part of the nation land value increases were rela-
tively small.
From 1910untilWorld War I agricultural prices were rela-
tively stable. During the war they increased rapidly and by
early 1920weremore than two and one-half times their average
for the prewar years(1910-14).Farmland values, whose
movements for the country as a whole are shown in Figure 2,also
increased, until at the peak in 1920theywere 73 percent above
their prewar level. Although land value increases were general,
they were largest, percentagewise, in the Southeast and in the
northwestern part of the Corn Belt, and smallest in the north-
eastern states. Regional differences in the rise of land values for
the entire decade 1910-20 areshown in Figure 3.
The war years, and especially the postwar years 1919and1920,
werecharacterized by a very active and speculative farm real6 INTRODUCTION
estate market. Foreclosures and forced transfers were relatively
few. Profits were often invested in more land, livestock, and
equipment. The feeling was widespread that prosperity would
continue Many of the areas• that were most pros-
Figure2. Distress Transfers, Voluntary Transfers, and Value of
Farm Real Estate per Acre, 1912-53
Land Value
Adopted from a chart by the Bureau of Economics. value
indexes (1912-14 = 100) refer to value of land and buildings as of March 1; transfer
data refer to transactions from March 16 through March 15 of the following year. Distress
transfers include assignments to avoid foreclosure, as well as foreclosures.
perousand in which land speculation was greatest during this
period were to suffer the most severe distress in the subsequent
farm depression.
Credit to finance both agricultural and industrial expansion
was plentiful during World War I. Between 1915and1920
morethan 3,ooo new banks were organized, most of them in
Transfers Forms8 INTRODUCTION
the Midwest. Farm debt rose rapidly. Mortgages increased from
aboutbillionin 1910to$5 billion at the end of 1916 (Figure
4). By the end of 1920,farmmortgage loans had passed the
$10billionmark, which was twice the level of 1916 and over
three times that of igio. Non-real-estate farm loans of commer-
cial banks also increased, rising from $i.6 billion at the begin-
ning of 1915toa peak of billionat the end of This
Figure 4. Farm MortgageDebt Held by Major Lender Groups,
1910-52
January figures. Data for 1910-30 are from Form-Mortgage Credit Facilities in the United
States, by Donald C. Horton, Harold C. Larsen, and Norman J. Wall (USDA, 1942 p. 12);
for 1931-34from Agricultural Statistics. 1948 (USDA); for 1935-52, fromAgricultural
Finance Review (BAE), Vol. 14, Supplement May 1952 (p. 2),
rapidgrowth of debt resulted partly from the need to meet
higher operating costs, to acquire new equipment and addi-
tional livestock, and to expand acreage, but above all it arose
from the purchase of farms in a rising land market. The South-
east and some areas of the West,particularly the Mountain
states, showed the greatest rise in farm mortgagedebt,5 and in
4AgriculturalFinance Review (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), Vol. 14,
SupplementMay 1952,Table19,p.27.
Ibid., Vol. 2,November Table 6, pp. goff.INTRODUCTION 9
those regions land values also increased greatly.6 In the North-
east, where the farm real estate market was relatively inactive,
the rise in mortgage debt was comparatively small)'
One important characteristic of the wartime mortgage debt
expansion was the sharp increase in the average size of new farm
mortgages recorded. In 1917, the first year for which estimates
are available, the average new mortgage loan amounted to
$2,640. In 1918 and 1919 the averages were $2,880 and $3,460,
respectively. In 1920 the average new farm mortgage loan
amounted to The increasing size of mortgage loans
meant in many instances an increase in the ratio of debt to
value, even at the higher level of farm land prices. The census
reported that for owner-operated mortgaged farms in 1910 the
debt amounted to 27.3 percent of the value; by 1920 the debt
was 29.1 percent of value.9 Not only did the period give rise to
larger loans, both in average size and relative to value, but the
proportion of mortgaged farms went up. The census reported
that 41.1 percent of all owner-operated farms were mortgaged in
1920, an increase from 33.6 percent in 1910.10
The Interwar Period
The agricultural depression of the interwar period began with
a spectacular collapse of agricultural prices in mid-1920. In May
of that year the index of farm prices reached 237 (1910-1914 =
i oo). By June of the following year the index had dropped to
iii. On the cost side, prices paid by farmers for commodities
used in production (including interest, taxes, and wages) also
dropped, but much less sharply, from an annual average of 214
ifl 1920 tO 155 ifl 192 1.11 The change in price relationships was
in itself sufficient to produce a drastic shrinking of net farm
incomes; and the situation was aggravated by droughts in several
of the northwestern states. Naturally, the enormously expanded
debt structure of agriculture was particularly vulnerable to such
a shock. Credit began to tighten and many loans were called,
0M.M. Regan and A. R. Johnson, The Farm Real Estate Situation, 1945-46
(U.S.Department of Agliculture, Circular No. 754), pp. 6 f.
7AgriculturalFinance Review, Vol. 2, November Table 6, pp. go if.
8AverageSize of Farm-Mortgage Recordings of Selected Lender Groups (Bureau
of Agricultural Economics, mimeo., November 1940),p.
9 16thCensus: 1940,Agriculture,Vol.Table6, p. 251.
10AgriculturalFinance Review, Vol. io, November 1947,Tablei,p.63.
11Indexesof prices received and paid by farmers are the revised series of the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics with January 1910throughDecember 1914as
the base period, from Agricultural Outlook Charts, 1953(October1952), page g.10 INTRODUCTION
beginning with short-term obligations. Many farmers were
forced out of business, and others borrowed on their remaining
real estate equity to repay their short-term loans. Refunding
was largely responsible for the continued rise in farm mortgage
debt, which reached its peak in 1923 (Figure 4).
Although by 1923 agricultural prices had made a substantial
recovery from the low point reached in 1921, the recovery was
not sufficient to restore price-cost relationships to the favorable
wartime level. Largely as a result, realized net income of farm
operators averaged 30 percent lower during the years 1923-29
than during Throughout most of the twenties land
values declined, reflecting adjustments to the lower level of farm
incomes. These declines eliminated the equity of many farmers
and often resulted in losses to lenders when foreclosure was
necessary. Distress transfers(foreclosures, and assignments to
avoid foreclosure) increased steadily after 1920. In that year
they had occurred at the rate of 4 per thousand farms; by 1926
the rate of distress transfers was over i 8 per thousand farms
(Figure 2).
Banking operations are another indicator of economic condi-
tions. Deposit withdrawals and the freezing of funds in unpaid
loans were more severe in rural than in industrial areas. From
1921 through 1929, 5,411 state and national banks suspended
operations; this was i8 percent of the number of banks active
in Of the suspended banks 92 percent were in small
cities and villages of less than io,ooo population. Bank closings
were particularly heavy in the Southeast, the Great Plains, and
the Mountain states—predominantly farming regions. In the
industrialized East and Northeast very few banks closed.'4
After difficulties in the twenties, agriculture faced catastrophe
in the early thirties. Prices of farm products dropped from the
onset of the depression in 1929 until by 1932 they were less
than half their 1929 average and were below the prewar prices
of Realized net income of farm operators, which had
reached $9.3 billion in 1919 and averaged $5.7 billion during
12 The Farm Income Situation (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), December
1952—January 1953, Table i, p. 4.
18 Banking and Monetary Statistics (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1943), pp. 19 and 283.
14 Ibid., p. 284.
15 Agricultural Outlook Charts, 1953(Bureauof Agricultural Economics, Octo-
her 1952), p. 9.INTRODUCTION 11
the years 1923-29, was estimated at only $1.9 billion for 1932.16
Farmers found it difficult or impossible to pay debts contracted
at higher income levels. Many loans were foreclosed and many
others were refinanced by federal agencies. For agriculture as a
whole, foreclosures and assignments to creditors rose from 15.7
per thousand farms in 1929 to 38.8 per thousand in 1932. There-
after the rate of distress transfers slowly declined, but remained
throughout the thirties well above the low level existing before
and during World War I, and did not subside that far until
1942 (Figure 2).
In the early thirties economic conditions were so serious that
several states passed laws that prohibited foreclosure, extended
redemption periods, and eliminated deficiency judgments (Fig-
ure 5). Among the measures taken by the federal government
were appropriation of additional funds for emergency crop and
feed loans, establishment of regional agricultural credit cor-
porations, bolstering the federal land banks with additional
government capital, and the reorganization of the Federal Farm
Loan System. Under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, direct govern-
ment mortgage loans were provided for many farmers who did
not qualify for regular federal land bank loans.
Out of the troubled thirties developed a different economic
and social philosophy involving more direct and comprehensive
action by the federal government in combating deflation. In
addition to the extensive pump priming expenditures there
were devaluation of the dollar, new banking legislation, and re-
vised tariff laws—all devices intended to activate and strengthen
the economy as a whole. For agriculture, the new legislation
introduced acreage restrictions, marketing quotas, marketing
agreements, price support loans, government purchases of com-
modities, parity payments, and the food stamp plan. These
measures were intended to raise prices of farm products. There
were also special programs aimed at improving the lot of the
lower-income farmers and assisting tenants to become farm
owners. In the last half of the decade realized net income of
farm operators showed some improvement, averaging between
$4 and $5 billion a year, more than doubling the low of
billion in 1932. Nevertheless, it was below theto$6 billion
level of the late twenties and substantially below the billion
peak of 1919.17
16 The Farm Income Situation, December 1952_January 1953, Table i, p. 4.
17 Ibid.INTRODUCTION 13
World War 11 and the Early Postwar Years
Agricultural prosperity increased rapidly during World War II.
By ithe level of agricultural prices was twice as high as that
of 1940 (Table i). Agricultural production, stimulated by high
prices and favorable weather, was at record volume. Production
costs were increasing, but not so fast as farm prices. Realized
net income of farm operators rose sharply and for 1945totaled
$12.3 billion, almost three times the 1940 amount.'8
TABLE 1
Index Numbers of Prices Received by Farmers, Prices Paid,














1940 100 100 100 100
1941 123 io6 103 141
1942 158 122 113 206
1943 192 137 117 268
1944 196 147 125 279
1945 206 152 122 286
1946 234 167 124 330
1947 275 193 123 390
1948 285 209 125 363
1949 249 202 125 316
1950 256 206 123 287
1951 302 227 127 333
1952 288b 231b 132 333b
Based on Bureau of Agricultural Economics indexes. For prices received and
paid by farmers, see Agricultural Outlook Charts, '95; (October 1952), page 9,
and Agricultural Prices, December 1952,page27.Forfarm production and
realized net income, see The Farm Income Situation, July-September1951,
pageandDecember 1952_January 1953, Tables i and ii, pagesand i6.
aIncludesprices of commodities, interest, taxes, and wages.
b Preliminary.
After the end of the war in 1945, inflation continued in all
segments of the economy. Agricultural prices continued to rise
and the total realized net income of farm operators in the
18 Ibid.14 INTRODUCTION
United States reached an all-time high of $i6.8 billion in 1947.
From then until the Korean outbreak the ratio of prices re-
ceived by farmers to prices paid became less favorable, and
net income of farm operators by 1949 had declined to $13.6
billion. Although agricultural prices increased during the last
half of 1950, net income for the year declined further to $12.3
billion. Primarily as a result of increased defense activity, net
income rose to $14.3 billion in 1951 and remained at that level
for 1952.
Naturally, the long period of wartime prosperity had a pro-
nounced effect on the financial position of agriculture. The
Balance Sheet of Agriculture, prepared by the Bureau of Agri-
cultural Economics, valued total assets of agriculture as of
January 1, 1952 at $168.7 billion, more than three times the
comparable figure, $53.7 billion, for 1940 (Table 2). As of
January 1953 farm assets have been tentatively estimated at
about $165 billion. Much of the increase in the values of real
TABLE 2
Balance Sheet of Agriculture, 1940 to 1953
(in billions>




crops 15.1 27.1 41.253.851.2
Financial 5.0 18.3 20.2 21.2 21.9
Total $53.7$107.2$136.7$168.7$165.4
Liabilities
Real estate debt $6.6$4.8$5.6$6.6 $7.1
Commodity Credit Corp.,
nonrecourse loans .4 .3 1.7 .6 1.2
Other non-real-estate
debt 3.0 2.9 5.2 7.6
Proprietors' equities 43.799.2124.2154.2149.5
Total $53.7$107.2$136.7$168.7$165.4
From The Balance Sheet of Agriculture, 1953 (Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
nomics, September 1953),page2.Amountsare given as of January i.
a Preliminary.
b Includes deposits and currency, United States savings bonds, and investment
in cooperatives.INTRODUCTION 15
estate, livestock, and crops resulted from the wartime rise in
market prices rather than from an increase in actual physical
assets. Physical assets in machinery, however, increased sub-
stantially; even after adjustment for price changes, the total
value of equipment in 1953 was more than double the 1940
figure. And, of course, the increase in financial assets from $5.0
to $21.9 billion reflected actual dollar additions to total assets.
One outstanding feature of the war years, so far as the finan-
cial position of agriculture is concerned, has been the behavior
of total farm mortgage debt in the United States. Credit was
plentiful during and after World War II, with keen competi-
tion among lenders. Sales of farm land reached record volume,
and there were signs of speculative activity in numerous resales
following brief ownership. Farm real estate values rose steadily.
By early 1946 the average value per acre was about 71 percent
above the average for 1940. At the beginning of 1953 the average
value was 154 percent above that of 1940 and 20 percent above
the highest level of the World War I boom (Table 3 and
Figure 2). Despite these developments, total farm mortgage debt
declined from $6.6 billion as of January 1, 1940 to a low of
$4.8 billion for 1946 (Table 4). Thereafter it increased to
billion for 1953. This is in sharp contrast with developments
during and after World War I, when farm mortgage debt
increased steadily from billion in 1915 to a high of $io.8
billion in1923(Figure 4).Non-real-estate debt, however,
reached a new high level after World War II. The volume of
such debt owed to the principal lending institutions on January
1, 1953 was $4.2 billion, which compares with a previous record
of billion in 1921.19
As would be expected, distress transfers of farms decreased
steadily as the financial position of agriculture improved. Dur-
ing 1939 distress transfers occurred at a rate of 12.6 per
thousand farms in the United States; during each of the years
the rate was less than 2 per thousand farms (Figure 2).
This is the lowest level for such transfers during the period for
which estimates are available, which extends back to 1912. It
contrasts sharply with the peak of 38.8 distress transfers per
thousand farms reached in 1932 and a yearly average of about
17 per thousand farms during the two decades from 1920 to
1940.
19AgriculturalFinance Review, Vol. 15, Supplement May ig5s, Table 23, p. 32.16 INTRODUCTION
TABLE 3




state 1940 1946 1953 1940-53
The Northeast
Maine 95 127 137 44%
NewHampshire 94 122 152 62
Vermont 101 144 196 94
Massachusetts 113 141 171 51
Rhode Island 120 159 203 69
Connecticut 124 i66 213 72
New York 86 120 175 103
New Jersey ii6 164 233 101
Pennsylvania 90 130 199 121
Appalachian states
Delaware 8g 136 199 124
Maryland 100 164 254 154
Virginia 112 200 310 177
West Virginia 85 122 165 94
North Carolina 138 265 446 223
Kentucky 113 219 330 192
Tennessee io8 212 321 197
Cotton Belt states
SouthCarolina 89 172 249 i8o
Georgia 82 146 235 187
Alabama 122 205 337 176
Mississippi io6 195 320 202
Arkansas 95 178 302 218
Louisiana 121 175 264 ii8
Oklahoma 93 154 250 169
Texas 99 151 230 132
Florida 133 268 286 115
CornBelt states
Ohio 77 140 223 190
Indiana 74 145 232 214
Illinois 75 124 210 iSo
Iowa 74 121 i88 154
Missouri 59 102 154 i6iINTRODUCTION 17
Region and Increase
state 1940 1946 1953 1940-53
Lake states
Michigan 91 i67 249 174%
Wisconsin 84 120 172 105
Minnesota 86 129 207 141
GreatPlains and
Mountain states
North Dakota 52 84 146 i8i
South Dakota 41 66 122 ig8
Nebraska 58 g6 t6g 191
Kansas 71 121 211 197
Montana 57 io6 143 151
Idaho 93 i66 172 85
Wyoming 74 148 223 201
Colorado 62 124 156 152
New Mexico 95 203 287 202
Arizona 107 209 281 163
Utah 74 113 132 78
Nevada 65 ii8 139 114
PacificCoast states
Washington 7' 126 '35 90
Oregon 73 125 130 78
California io6 222 209 97
United States 82 140 208 154
FromThe Farm Real Estate Market (Bureau of Agricultural Economics),
July1953, pages 22 f.; data as of March i.Datafor 1946arefrom a September
releaseby the BAE.
FinancialPosition of Agriculture, 1953
While total farm debt had increased nearly ioo percent by early
'953 from the low point reached in 1946, the amount of the
debt was still less than 10percentof the estimated value of
total assets. As of January i,1953the financial assets of farmers
(deposits and currency, United States savings bonds, and invest-
ment in cooperatives) were estimated at more than one and
one-third times the total of farm debt, whereas in 1940such18 INTRODUCTION
TABLE 4
Farm Mortgage Debt, 1946, and 1953,
and Non-real-estate Debt, 1943 and 1953













Maine $24.8$17.,$22.6 $9.0$18.2 102%
New Hampshire 11.2 io.6 21.591 2.1 4.3io6
Vermont 27.8 23.2 38.3 5.8 17.8207
Massachusetts 45.8 35.0 47.1 3 2.9 8.4184
Rhode Island 4.1 3.6 5.021 1.0 1.6141
Connecticut 36.7 25.334.4 —6 3.3 10.7226
New York 191.8145.1204.3 7 33.4102.2206
New Jersey 48.8 39.2 73.150 6.7 17.1157
Pennsylvania 131.6104.7172.531 23.778.4 230
Appalachian states
Delaware 8.o 6.o 11.342 i.6 5.3228
46.7 39.6 70.751 6.4 22.3249
Virginia 72.3 60.9 99.137 ig.6 47.9144
West Virginia 22.0 i8.o 31.242 6.2 11.787
North Carolina 90.1 78.1139.855 16.3 40.3147
Kentucky 109.3 24 25.1 73.5192
Tennessee 92.6 66.5112.822 21.465.5 206
Cotton Belt states
South Carolina 45.9 37.4 56.022 17.2 24.7
Georgia 82.0 69.4133.262 35.86i.872
Alabama 8i.g 66.2ioi.824 33.3 52.457
Mississippi 100.4 85.8136.035 43.98i.686
Arkansas 72.5 66.oii6.66i 32.4 72.9125
Louisiana 55.1 48.3 70.728 23.3 43.185
Oklahoma io8.o157.1 2 125.3147
Texas 431.7313.7525.922 155.4385.9148
Florida 38.1 30.9113.5198 17.2 45.5
Corn Belt states
Ohio 239.1167.2289.421 39.0109.2i8o
Indiana 236.3168.5250.6 6 35.8106.9198
Illinois 419.0251.6316.4 —24 72.7246.5 239
Iowa 705.6476.2521.0 —26 110.5317.0187
Missouri 229.4184.1220.2 —4 7i.8188.7163INTRODUCTION 19
TABLE 4 (Concluded)
Non-real-es-




1943-53b 1940 1946 1953
Lake states
Michigan $174.3$139.4$191.410% $25.9$82.5 218%
Wisconsin 356.9245.7326.6—8 35.3104.1195
Minnesota 376.0286.8316.4 —i6 73.3178.0143
GreatPlains
andMountain states
North Dakota 141.2 83.0 74.0 —48 61.558.1 —5
South Dakota 127.7 99.4 io6.o—17 70.7 93.332
Nebraska 309.8181.9i86.8 —40 84.1205.0144
Kansas 284.2151.5183.7 —35 88.o200.7128
Montana 66.i 41.7 86.831 37.2 65.777
Idaho 78.8 56.2107.937 19.5 6o.8211
Wyoming 340 24.3 53.958 22.0 43.598
Colorado 75.0 60.9151.5102 52.7i6o.8205
New Mexico 27.5 26.5 6g.o151 15.7 41.2163
Arizona 28.9 23.0 49.772 12.262.3 410
Utah 36.6 26.2 52.543 17.1 44.7
Nevada 10.2 6.9 17.774 3.5 12.7264
Pacific Coast states
Washington 106.9 76.9149.740 22.0 53.5143
Oregon 90.4 71.6155.472 14.6 58.7303
California 407.6333.0633.655 93.6313.0 234
United States $6,586.4 $4,76o5 $7,140.58%$1,672.5 $4,225.3 153%
Figures are given as of January 1.
aData for 1940arefrom Harold T. Lingard's Farm-Mortgage Loans and Their Distribution
by Lender Groups, 1940-48 (U.s. Department of Agriculture, Circular 812, August 1949), Table 30,
page49; data for 1946 and are from Agricultural Finance Review (Bureau of Agricultural
Economics), Vol. 15,SupplementMay 1953, pages 20 and 27.
b Percentage changes were calculated before rounding debt figures to the nearest o.i million.
c Non-real-estate debt includes that part held by banks and federal and federally sponsored
agencies and excludes price support loans made or guaranteed by the Commodity Credit Corpora.
tion. Data for 1943 were supplied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm
Credit Administration, and the Farmers Home Administration; data for 1953 are from Agricul-
t?.Lrat Finance Review, Vol. '5, Supplement May 1953,page33.
d Includes District of Columbia.20 INTRODUCTION
items had amounted to only one-half the farm debt (Table 2).
Farm debt increased further during 1953 but continued low in
relation to the amount of assets owned by farmers.
Despite a relatively low total farm debt in the United States,
however, substantial numbers of individual farmers are heavily
indebted. In each year from March 1947 to March 1953 more
than half of all farm sales involved credit financing.20 In these
credit sales as a whole the debt has averaged more than half the
purchase price, and in a fifth of them it has amounted to 75
percent or more of the purchase price. The average size of new
farm mortgage loans recorded in 1952 was $5,630, which com-
pares with $2,370 rn 1940.21 No doubt many of the recent loans
have been for amounts exceeding the prewar value of the farm.
Non-real-estate or short-term loans are another important
part of the current farm debt picture. Such debt, excluding
nonrecourse price support loans, increased from $2.9 to $7.6
billion between 1946 and '953 to exceed the total farm real
estate debt (Table 2). In periods of declining farm income,
short-term loans are often the first to be called and become a
direct source of financial distress. If they cannot be repaid, they
are likely to be refunded into long-term mortgages, as fre-
quently happened in the early twenties. Accordingly, if farm
incomes should decline in the years ahead, short-term debt
might require considerable refunding and in that way it could
swell the outstanding volume of long-term credit.
As this is being written, in the fall of general economic
activity remains high. But prices received by farmers for several
important commodities have declined substantially from 1952
levels, and farm costs have decreased relatively little. Price-
cost relationships are expected to continue less favorable in
1954, and the decline in agricultural prices currently is a sub-
ject of considerable concern to farm lenders. In some areas
farmers are not repaying loans as quickly as expected and a
few short-term loans have been refinanced with long-term farm
mortgage loans. While the volume of actual debt distress is
believed to be very small, the attitudes of both farmer and
lender toward credit have become more cautious in recent
months.
20TheFarm Real Estate Market (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), July
1951,p.7, and July 1953,pp. 13 f.
21FarmMortgages Recorded, 1944(FarmCredit Administration), Table jo,
p. 14;andThe Balance Sheet of Agriculture, 1953 (Bureau of Agricultural Eco-
.nomics, Agr. ml. Bul. No. 115).p.23.INTRODUCTION 21
Scope of the Study
The chapters that follow offer an analytical review of farm
mortgage distress in the United States mainly during the inter-
war period. Extension of the analysis to earlier periods was
virtually prohibited by the extreme sketchiness of the data prior
to 1920.DuringWorld War II and the subsequent years there
have been very few foreclosures or signs of farm financial dis-
tress. For that period the discussion will merely touch on the
development of conditions that might lead to future distress.
The introductory historical survey has dealt with trends of
prices and farm prosperity mainly for agriculture as a whole.
The over-all trends, of course, result from conditions in highly
disparate segments of the farm economy. Farm incomes were
far from uniformly depressed during the years 1920-40.Insome
parts of the country a combination of low prices for the prin-
cipal products and crop failures due to bad weather or other
production hazards created serious financial distress. Some other
areas encountered comparatively little difficulty. And even with-
in relatively small type-of-farming areas there were substantial
variations in individual farm incomes and financial distress.
Hereafter attention will be concentrated for the most part on
these •variations in farm mortgage distress—both among geo-
graphical areas and among individual farms.
Anyone familiar with agriculture is well aware that the
factors associated with success and failure are many and varied.
Some are based on the physical characteristics of a region and
the economic characteristics of its principal products. Others
are closely related to the individual farmer and his farm—local
soil conditions, size and organization of the farm business, ex-
tent of debt, and the capabilities of the farmer and his family.
It has seemed desirable, therefore, from the standpoin.ts of both
analysis and presentation to divide the book into two parts, the
first entitled "The Economic Geography of Farm Mortgage Dis-
tress," and the second, "Farm Mortgage Distress and Individual
Farm Organization."
In Part I, which is concerned with geographical variations,
the first task is to locate the conspicuous mortgage trouble spots
of the interwar period as well as the principal areas where mort-
gage experience was substantially better than average. This is
done mainly through maps showing state and county differences
in the rate of distress transfers of farms and in the loan experi-22 INTRODUCTION
ence of land banks and insurance companies, with correlative
information on land values, bank deposits, and other pertinent
factors. Still more important than the location of the mortgage
trouble spots is the identification of the basic economic and
climatological factors that appear responsible. Most of Part I
is devoted to analyzing causes of mortgage distress in such major
farming areas as the Corn Belt, the Cotton Belt, and the Great
Plains.
Part II deals with variations among individual farm businesses
within a single region or type-of-farming area and their relation
to differences in debt carrying capacity and mortgage experi-
ence. Principal consideration is given to physical variations that
affect farm productivity, and to financial variations in the or-
ganization of the farm business.